security(lottie): validate postMessage origin on web HTML renderer#2294
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security(lottie): validate postMessage origin on web HTML renderer#2294cursor[bot] wants to merge 1 commit into
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The Lottie web HTML renderer listened for window messages without checking event.origin and used wildcard postMessage targets. A cross-origin page with a window reference could spoof onComplete/onForward callbacks and trigger YAML-defined actions. Restrict iframe and host traffic to the app origin and add regression tests. Co-authored-by: Sharjeel Yunus <sharjeelyunus@users.noreply.github.com>
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Vulnerability summary
The Lottie web HTML renderer listened for
window.postMessageevents without checkingevent.originand used wildcard ("*") targets when posting back to the parent frame. A cross-origin page with awindowreference to the Ensemble app could spoofonComplete/onForwardcallbacks and trigger YAML-defined actions.Affected location
modules/ensemble/lib/widget/lottie/web/lottiestate.dartSecurity impact
Severity: Medium
window.open) or otherwise holds a reference to its window.ScreenController().executeAction()runs configured YAML callbacks.Fix approach
Restrict iframe ↔ host
postMessagetraffic to the app origin and validate incoming message origins before dispatching callbacks.Tests
modules/ensemble/test/lottie_post_message_test.dart